Public Inquiry into
Foreign Interference in
Federal Electoral
Processes and Democratic
3 May 2024
Public Inquiry into
Foreign Interference in
Federal Electoral
Processes and Democratic
Institutions
The Honourable Marie-Josée Hogue, Commissioner
Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions – Initial Report 2
Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes
and Democratic Institutions – Initial Report.
© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, 2024.
All rights reserved.
All requests for permission to reproduce this document of any part
thereof shall be addressed to the Privy Council Office.
Cette publication est également disponible en français :
Enquête publique sur l’ingérence étrangère dans les processus
électoraux et les institutions démocratiques fédéraux – Rapport initial.
CP32-169/1-2024E-PDF
ISBN: 978-0-660-70643-6
Message from the Commissioner
Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions – Initial Report 3
Message from the
Commissioner
There is growing concern about foreign interference in our electoral processes
and democratic institutions. In this context, the government established the
Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions (“the Commission”). I have the honour of chairing the
Commission and presenting this report.
The Commission recently completed the first phase of its work, which
focused on three issues.
• The first is to determine whether China, Russia and other foreign
actors interfered in the 2019 and 2021 federal general elections and, if
so, the potential impact of this interference on the integrity of the
elections.
• The second is to examine the flow of information to senior decision-
makers, as well as between the Security and Intelligence Threats to
Elections Task Force (“SITE TF”) and the panel of five senior public
servants tasked with informing Canadians in the event of a critical
electoral incident that would threaten the integrity of the elections
(the “Panel of Five”).
• The third is to examine the measures taken by the government in
response to the information it had.
In the second stage of its work, the Commission will examine the capacity of
various state actors and processes to detect, deter and counter foreign
interference, and make recommendations on how to strengthen this capacity.
The Commission’s work is far from over.
An initial report to share my preliminary findings
This report sets out my preliminary findings and conclusions regarding the first
stage of the Commission’s work. These findings are preliminary to the extent
that my work is ongoing and may shed further light on relevant events. This
report should therefore be read and understood with this reservation in mind,
understanding that some of its findings may need to be qualified or modified.
Readers should also be aware that the Commission was not in a position to test
the information collected by the intelligence agencies or question the
conclusions they may have reached. Cognizant of what intelligence is and the
limitations it may have, however, I considered the indications given by the
agencies as to the degree of reliability of the information collected.
In view of its tight deadlines, and recognizing that its mission is not to make
findings of liability, the Commission also did not consider it appropriate to
take extraordinary steps to reconcile any contradictory evidence that may
have been adduced. However, the issues raised have been instructive for the
future of my work.
As to the involvement that some individuals may have had in certain acts of
foreign interference, or their degree of knowledge of these acts, I have
intentionally avoided making findings on the basis of intelligence alone.
I believe that doing so would have been unfair to these individuals because
they did not have a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations made
against them, and it would ignore the inherent limitations of intelligence.
That said, I am pleased with what the Commission’s work to date has enabled
us to discover. In particular, I am reassured that our electoral system is, all in
all, robust and that foreign interference did not impact which party formed the
Government in 2019 and in 2021.
I say “all in all” because, as you will see upon reading this report,
I nevertheless believe that foreign interference is a real phenomenon that we
must reckon with. Interference occurred in the last two general elections, and
indeed continues to occur frequently. It is likely to increase and have negative
consequences for our democracy unless vigorous measures are taken to
detect and better counter it.
The facts revealed by the evidence I have heard so far show that intelligence
agencies collected information about troubling events that occurred in a
handful of ridings during the 2019 and 2021 elections. However, given the
multitude of factors that may affect how someone casts their vote, and the
secrecy of their vote, it is impossible for me to determine whether those
events had an impact on the election results in these ridings.
The integrity of the electoral system, however, goes beyond the result of the
election itself. Our electoral system is based on the principle of fairness
among voters: every vote counts equally, and is treated as having the same
value, weight, and potential effect. Fairness presupposes that voters have
access to reliable information, can take part in robust discussions and are
free to think for themselves and form their own opinions. In my view, the
events named in this report likely diminished the ability of some voters to cast
an informed vote, thereby tainting the process. There may not be many so
affected, but even a small number should be a concern.
A report firmly supported by evidence
I have considered all the evidence before me. I have had access to the relevant
documents without any redactions for reasons of national security,1 and I have
heard all the witnesses named by the Commission’s lawyers as well-placed to
shed light on the events that are covered by this aspect of my mandate. I heard
most of the Government of Canada witnesses twice: once in camera, so that they
could testify without fear of publicly disclosing information that could be injurious
to national security, and a second time at public hearings.
This report deals with most of the evidence I received, my interpretation of it
and my preliminary findings. As certain facts cannot be disclosed publicly for
reasons of national security, the report includes a classified supplement that
may only be consulted by those with the requisite security clearance and a
“need to know”, as provided for by the Commission’s Terms of Reference. To
maximize transparency, I have shown as much information as possible in the
public report, and restricted the information contained in the classified
supplement to what is strictly necessary. I took the same approach in the
public hearings, where I required that all information that could be made
public be presented.
I would add that the contents of the classified supplement do not appear to
me to be essential to the public’s understanding of what happened, although
they do contain details relating to particular events described in the report
that should be useful to decision-makers.
In the end, the report reveals more information than many expected, and I am
confident it gives the public a better understanding of what foreign
interference is, why we should be wary of it, how it manifested itself in the last
two federal general elections, and how the government responded.
I would like to emphasize that I was pleased with the cooperation I received from
all those who took part in the Commission’s work. I would like to thank them all.
The Commission’s lawyers worked tirelessly to complete the first phase of its
mandate in time. Given the tight timeline the Commission was given to
complete its work and the complexity (both substantive and logistical) of that
work, the hours were extremely long for all Commission staff. But they all
demonstrated impeccable dedication and work ethic.
The Government of Canada was cooperative in facilitating the availability and
scheduling of the many current and former government interviewees and
witnesses. It also made significant efforts to respond to the Commission’s
requests for public disclosure and enable it to disclose as much information
as possible. Timing was sometimes problematic, but the efforts were
considerable.
1 Some documents contained redactions for Cabinet confidence, solicitor-client privilege or protection
of personal information. Discussions as to the application of these privileges is ongoing.
The cooperation of other Participants and their counsel was also exemplary.
I recognize that the conditions in which they had to work were not always optimal.
With the Commission facing very tight deadlines, hearing days often continued
well beyond normal hours, and the work needed to disclose some documents
often continued until the eleventh hour. But Participants and their counsel all
rolled up their sleeves to do their jobs. They understood that it was in the public
interest for the Commission to complete the first phase of its work on time, and
that this required them to show great flexibility. I thank them for this, and for the
professionalism they have shown in working with the Commission.
The Privy Council Office staff provided the Commission with necessary and
valuable logistical support while ensuring that the Commission’s
independence was always respected.
In addition, all those who attended the hearings were respectful, which
permitted the hearings to run smoothly and serenely.
A report that concerns us all
We need to take a closer look at attempted foreign interference in our democratic
processes if we are to prevent hostile state actors from achieving their goals. To
achieve this, we need better communication and collaboration between various
players. Several worthwhile initiatives were taken in the run-up to the 2019 and
2021 elections, but there is still room for evolution and improvement.
The evidence seems to demonstrate that the roles of some actors in existing
processes are not always well understood, that there are sometimes
significant differences of opinion between the intelligence community and
elected officials, and that the fear of disclosing information that could
undermine national security is a major impediment to information sharing.
The nature of the information gathered and shared by intelligence agencies
seems to raise the suspicions of many, who may prefer to refrain from acting
when such information is brought to their attention. The Commission will
investigate these questions more deeply in the next phase of its work.
I believe that foreign interference should be a subject of interest to the
Canadian public, and, for this reason, I hope that this report is taken note of
and read by as many people as possible. I have therefore tried to write it so
that it can be understood by readers less familiar with the details of the
electoral system, and who have no knowledge of the machinery of
government or foreign interference itself. I hope to have succeeded. The
following pages are about our democracy, our values and what can threaten
them. That is why this report concerns us all.
Marie-Josée Hogue, Commissioner
Newsessentials Blog 
Posted on May 23, 2024
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