JOURNAL OF N ATIONAL S ECURITY L AW & P OLICY [Vol. 1:5
- In 2003, a Justice Department official testified that the government had brought
“support” charges against 61 individuals. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, House Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (prepared statement
of Alice Fisher, Deputy Ass’t Attorney General); see also Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper
Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. L EGIS.
(forthcoming 2005). - The statutory phrase is “material support or resources.” I use the phrase “material
support” as a shorthand for the full statutory phrase. - The earliest reference to conspiracy as a prosecutor’s darling is probably in Judge
Learned Hand’s concurrence in Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (“that
darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery”). - Most of the huge output of scholarly treatment of issues arising out of the current war
on terrorism has focused on procedural and constitutional issues, such as the long-time
incarceration of individuals as enemy combatants and the prospect of prosecution in military
tribunals. Several articles deal with the material support offenses, but these focus either on
constitutional issues arising out of the scope of application of §2339B, see, e.g., Robert M.
Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association
Critique, 101 M ICH. L. REV. 1408, 1452 n.122 (2003) (review essay), or procedural-
constitutional issues arising from the process for designating a foreign terrorist organization.
See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, A Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. S CH.
L. REV. 125 (2004).
key elements in the government’s anti-terrorism efforts. 3 Section 2339A
makes it a federal crime knowingly to provide material support or resources4
in preparation for or in carrying out specified crimes of terrorism. Section
2339B prohibits knowingly providing material support to a foreign terrorist
organization. These statutes bear some resemblance to criminal liability for
complicity, but they are being used like a new kind of conspiracy charge, the
familiar “prosecutor’s darling.”5 Unlike conspiracy, they are framed with a
mens rea of knowledge rather than of purpose, and because they are
substantive offenses, they can be combined with traditional conspiracy
charges. These provisions can be used to impose punishment for conduct
remote from the commission of criminal harms, often conduct involving
minimal and outwardly non-criminal acts.
While some judicial decisions have found constitutional infirmities in
specific terms of these new crimes, Congress undoubtedly can constitutionally
legislate such offenses. The courts should understand how these crimes are
innovative, and they should take these insights into account in construing the
statutes. They also should pay attention to the long-term implications of the
extensive use of these two new substantive offenses both for the federal
criminal law and, potentially, for the criminal law of the several states as
well. 6
These two new offenses may be the most significant doctrinal
developments in the federal criminal law since the enactment of RICO and the
other organizational crime statutes, the money laundering statutes, and the
criminal forfeiture laws. They show how each new federal criminal “war” –
from Prohibition through the wars on organized crime, on illegal drugs, and
now on terror – has spawned new laws or legal doctrines designed to expand
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Posted on April 30, 2024
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