Entrevista a Stefan Lehne
Leonídio Paulo Ferreira
30 abril 2024 às 10:16
On the eve of celebrating 20 years of the biggest enlargement in the history of the EU, Austrian diplomat Stefan Lehne, who was once in the service of the European Union and is now a member of Carnegie Europe, spoke with DN about the future of this EU of 27, which could be 35.
There is a very interesting idea of yours which is to call the European Union a “reluctant magnet”, because the EU really is a magnet, but the last accession was Croatia, 11 years ago. Is it a lack of enthusiasm from the candidate countries or is it more of a lack of enthusiasm from the EU itself?
I think it’s both, actually. I clearly think that when enlargement to Central Europe occurred, in 2004 and then in 2007, there was massive EU involvement. The Commission had its best collaborators working on this dossier. It was the EU’s flagship project at that time. And it was incredibly important, because if this enlargement to ten countries, and then two more, had not been successful, the EU would have faced a very deep crisis. When it was all completed, and it was a very challenging project, there was a certain amount of enlargement fatigue. Not everything went well. There were corruption problems in Romania and Bulgaria, which entered in 2007. There were many legal problems, starting with Hungary, which was part of the 2004 decade. Therefore, enthusiasm for the next phase of enlargement was not very strong. But I also think it has to be said that the Western Balkans, and it was basically about the accession of the Western Balkans for a long time, have issues that are more difficult to resolve than Central and Eastern Europe.
Is it still the legacy of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s?
Absolutely. Reconciliation between the partners, as happened between Germany and France at the end of the Second World War, never actually happened there.
Are you talking mainly about the ethnic divisions in Bosnia and also the tension between Serbia and Kosovo?
I think that between Croatia and Serbia, between the various factions in Bosnia, in the Kosovo War itself, none of these wars ended like the Second World War, that is, in a very clear way. There are sort of competing narratives. And the resentments survive to this day. They achieved a high degree of normalization, but it is not complete. A second issue is that these countries were part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, and this was a completely decentralized empire, without very strong state institutions. Thus, the tradition of strong state institutions did not exist in several of these countries, which made it more difficult, of course, to develop the institutional capacity to move towards the European Union. They have made a lot of progress, but they have deficits and are very poor, and they also have the problem of brain drain. Many people did not want to wait until their country became part of the European Union and took their families and moved to Germany, Austria and other countries. And this is also, of course, a disadvantage for these Balkan countries. For various reasons, the integration of the Western Balkans was seen as quite difficult and challenging and, at the same time, the EU went through a series of crises, financial crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, the pandemic, etc., and decision-makers were somewhat distracted. Nobody had much time for this stuff, basically. Therefore, engagement was not at the level that would have made a difference.
With the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, suddenly something changed, not specifically about the Western Balkans, but even in a broader approach to enlargement, as there began to be talk of the accession of even Ukraine, Moldova and even Georgia. Is it a realistic objective to talk about enlarging further eastwards at a time when there is a war in Ukraine?
I think the understanding in the EU is that we don’t want gray areas in Europe, a gray area between Russia and the EU, that it is in our interest to integrate these countries so that they are part of the European mainstream. This is a new vision, I think. Five years ago, many European countries would have said, well, these countries need to have excellent relations with Russia, they need to have good relations with us, we need to partially integrate them, but they should be somewhere in the middle. After Putin’s aggression, people started saying that there can be nothing in between, and people also said that to support Ukraine and give it guarantees of long-term engagement, over decades, basically, and mobilize everything in this sense, the prospect of adhesion is vital. And, of course, this is what the Ukrainians wanted back in 2004, and I remember that in 2014 they had blue flags on Maidan Square in Kiev. This was a very, very important goal for society. So if the EU had said, no, we support you in the war, it’s terrible that you were attacked, but we don’t want you in the European Union, that would have been extremely negative.
He said that this enlargement, with Ukraine’s accession, is in the EU’s interests. But won’t it be difficult for European public opinion to accept, because we think about enlargement in terms of money, funds, budget distribution, and we look at Ukraine, a huge and poor country even before the war? For example, in countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, although there is a lot of solidarity with Ukraine, we talk about the costs of enlargement and there is a fear that there will be a negative impact in terms of the budget, in terms of the so-called cohesion funds. Is this true and do we have to accept it?
I think there are a lot of myths out there. There are those who say that all cohesion funds will go to Ukraine and that there will be nothing left and that all net beneficiary countries will become net contributors. This is all nonsense. Because I think that the few serious studies that I have seen from Bruegel, which is a very important think tank in Brussels, and from Ceps, another very important think tank , indicate that the integration of Ukraine will be a long-term process and there will be long periods of transition and there will be limits to funding. For example, I believe there is an upper limit for cohesion funding, most cohesion funding is 2.5% of GDP, why can’t they absorb more either. This means that, in real terms, financing for Ukraine will not be very important and, according to Bruegel’s study, all net beneficiaries will remain net beneficiaries. The Ceps study states that all net beneficiaries will continue to be net beneficiaries, with the exception of Spain, which is already very close to moving towards a net payer position. So the impact is not huge. Contributions will increase a little, but that doesn’t change the game. It will not be fundamentally harmful to the interests of the countries that are now net beneficiaries.
We are just over a month away from the European elections. I know we are talking about 27 different countries and normally there are much more national issues in the campaign than European issues. This election should be no different. Isn’t EU enlargement therefore at the center of the debate?
I think it’s unlikely that enlargement will be a very dominant issue, but I think the debate that’s already happening is about this kind of threat that radical right parties will increase their percentage of members in the European Parliament and how that might affect the decision process in important projects. There are people who believe that if the two most right-wing groups win seats, then on issues such as migration, climate change, possibly the rule of law, the European Parliament will adopt a much more restrictive and conservative line. I’m not sure because I don’t think that, ultimately, the success of these groups is going to be that important. I think that, fundamentally, we will continue to have a center that maintains European unity, a center made up of the EPP, the socialists, the liberals and, on some issues, the greens. Together, they will be the majority and will determine the decision-making of the European Parliament.
He mentioned that during the different crises, from the financial crisis to the pandemic, the result was always that European integration became stronger. Even with Brexit? Or was leaving the UK a different kind of trauma?
I don’t think that crises always make the EU stronger. There are crises that weaken it. I think the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016 caused a lot of division. It fueled the rise of the radical right, generated major divisions between countries, and the EU did not grow stronger. Brexit is mixed, because I think the UK leaving was a terrible loss. It has a very capable foreign policy, it has a very important economy and, for the EU’s prestige, losing one of its largest member states was horrible around the world. So Brexit was something very negative. On the other hand, the UK has never really been at the center of the EU. They were not part of Schengen, they were not part of the monetary union, and on many issues, in particular security policy, also in terms of financing, the British were extremely conservative and quite negative. So when they left, certain things became possible that were not possible before, in terms of defense policy, in terms of reconstruction funds, and, for example, the response to the pandemic would not have worked with the United Kingdom, the whole Budget planning would have seemed much more difficult. So, in some aspects, the UK’s departure facilitated the advancement of important integration projects, but, personally, I must say that, overall, it was still a loss. So I think we lost more than we gained, but it’s not entirely a negative side and it’s not all black, there’s also a positive side to it.
In Portugal we are celebrating 50 years of the revolution that put an end to the dictatorship, and accession to the then EEC in the 1980s was very important for the consolidation of Portuguese democracy. Is this something that still happens when a new country joins the EU? Does it become more democratic after accession?
The Copenhagen criteria, which are the criteria for countries to join the European Union, have not changed and it is very important that these countries are functional democracies, that they respect human rights, that the rule of law works. Otherwise, if it doesn’t happen…
Before yes, even due to the requirement. But after accession, is there an increase in the level of democracy?
Not always. Unfortunately, we have had the experience for some time in Poland and Hungary that the situation can also go in the other direction. That, once a country has joined, the discipline that one has during the enlargement process no longer exists and the instruments that the EU has to ensure that the rule of law survives and flourishes are not yet fully developed. There is the famous Article 7 of the Treaty, which is very difficult to implement because the threshold for decision-making is too high. We now have the new economic conditionality. It is possible to block access to financing if the rule of law is not truly respected, which also has negative consequences for the EU budget. And this gives some advantage and has led to some legislative changes in Hungary, for example. But it is true that there is no guarantee. If the country becomes more authoritarian again and the EU does not have the type of instruments to ensure that developments go in the right direction. And so many people believe that if we look at the next enlargement, at the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, we have to ensure that these instruments for guaranteeing the rule of law are also strengthened. We can do it in accession treaties, we can do it through secondary legislation, but many Member States consider this to be a key element in making the next enlargement a success, to have good instruments to ensure that the rule of law is sustained.
There is much debate about the need to change the decision-making process in the European Union. Does a possible enlargement increase the difficulty of reaching consensus and therefore increase the need to carry out reform?
Well, in principle, obviously. Now we are talking about an EU that could have 35 member states, right? If we assume that all Western Balkan countries and Eastern European countries will join. Of course, unanimity among 35 countries is harder to achieve than in 27. So I think there is some interest in moving toward majority voting on more issues. But I’m not very optimistic. I think that there are still a large number, a considerable number of Member States that think that the veto is essential to preserve their national interest. So I’m not sure we’ll see any major changes in that regard. But you also need to keep in mind that the decision-making process is just one element of effectiveness. Another thing is leadership. If there are excellent leaders on the Commission, if there are French and German leaders who work well together, that could actually be more important than whether decisions are taken unanimously or by a qualified majority. And overall, there have been studies comparing the effectiveness of the EU before the big enlargement of 2004 and 2007 and after, and the difference is not huge. Therefore, if we look at the legislative process regarding the number of cases before the European Court of Justice, overall, enlargement has not significantly changed the effectiveness of the EU. So this indicates something important: majority voting is a good thing, but ultimately it’s not the only thing.
About Turkey, the eternal candidate. Is it possible to imagine Turkey as a member state? Or is it something that no one really wants to resolve, assuming that the EU doesn’t want this huge country, with a different culture, a different geography?
I don’t think Turkey’s accession is likely at this point. Because I think that the mood in the European Union and in public opinion has not changed. There are large sectors of society in several Member States that are very hostile to this idea, and an accession treaty must be agreed by all and ratified by all Member States. In France, for example, there is a provision that requires a referendum on accessions that can only be annulled with a huge majority in the Senate. So I think, realistically, that Turkey will not be a member in the near future. And I don’t think the leadership in Ankara still believes that or even wants that. Because Turkey is a very successful country. It has major economic issues to resolve, but it is very influential. It has a regional projection of power towards Central Asia. It is very important in Africa. It is today a major player economically, even in the Balkans. Therefore, I do not believe that it is really in the interest of Turkey’s leadership to be part of the European Union. Turkish rulers would find this restrictive. And your geopolitical game is different from the European game, it is between Russia and the United States. It’s a very complicated game, which they are doing very well. But they are absolutely not aligned with EU decision-making and European foreign policy. They are usually in a completely different position. So I don’t think membership is a realistic prospect.
There is a lot of talk about the need for a common defense project by the European Union. But, at the same time, one of the European Union’s greatest assets is soft power, ideas, democracy, the Social State, the fight against climate change, etc. But at the same time that there is so much debate about investing more in defense, not depending so much on the ally the United States, there is also a loss of influence in terms of ideals. How do you see this contradiction?
Well, I think the threat is back. No one can doubt that. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine proved this. I think that if Russia wins in Ukraine, there will be a threat to the Baltic States. There will be a threat to Moldova and others. And the EU, the Western European countries, have been enjoying the peace dividend for several decades and have spent very little on defense. And there is absolutely a need to invest again in military security. And then there will be big divisions over how much this can be done within the EU and how much should be done within NATO. Why are there some countries that say we can no longer trust the United States. That Donald Trump could return to the White House. That the United States is turning to the Indo-Pacific. That the rivalry with China is much more important to Americans. And therefore, they will no longer be as committed to European security. But there are others who say that everything we do to make Europe more autonomous is taking us away from the protection of the United States. And we don’t want that. Therefore, there are still very large divisions on this issue. But regarding the fact that we need to invest more in our security, I think there is broad agreement. But I think it is true that the EU will never be a military superpower. There is no doubt about that. It’s extremely unlikely. The EU’s influence will be because it is a major economic actor, exporting rules and regulations. It’s the so-called Brussels effect: the EU’s greatest strength is exporting our standards and rules around the world. Now we are also doing this in the digital area. We are the largest commercial power in the world and we are also the power most open to imports. These are our strengths and we will continue to rely on them. But, of course, we are also using high technology, cyberspace, and among the 20 largest companies there are only two European ones. Everything else is American or Chinese. We must be very careful not to be dissociated from the most dynamic parts of economic development and to protect our interests in this area. But I don’t think anyone believes that Europe’s power in the future will be primarily a military security power. I think it will be a soft power, both in terms of our attractiveness and economic success, but also in terms of culture, in terms of being part of multilateral diplomacy and trying to preserve something of the liberal world order, to the extent that it is still possible. .
Newsessentials Blog 
Posted on April 30, 2024
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